Donald,

Personally, I thought that Ben's comments put an end to this "debate" quite a few posts back.

His credentials as an Air Force pilot and his direct association with pilots of the A-10 seem to lend an enormous amount of credibility to his position.

With all due respect, you fly a 172. Perhaps you can educate me and others as to why we should pay any mote of attention to your opinion.

Jgreen

______________________

...on a related note in this thread--Jim says: "...I'm sure they'd like to have the A-10. Since other systems can do most of that mission, it is presently an unaffordable luxury. Concerning abuse, F-15s land with half a wing, and 16s/18s etc are all amazingly tough. A-10 had a high loss rate in Desert Storm, and were restricted from ops in certain areas due to ADA threats. 30/40 year old ADA threats, operated by an incompetent, shattered third world military."

--I've been thinking over this comment and request that he or others please elaborate as this is quite an assertion and is somewhat in contradiction of history's recording of the A-10's overall relative success in Desert Storm...and in doing so please give your perspective on what is a "high loss rate" and in your analysis do so in comparison to other Coalition Aircraft losses in the Gulf War and include key factors such as relative sortie rates, difficulty/risk of assigned missions, operational readiness (mission capable rate), success of assigned missions as far as armor kills, etc...also, notwithstanding its capacity being severely diminished due to an extremely effective bombing campaign by our forces, provide analysis on reaching the conclusion that Iraq was a "third world" military...[/quote]
Compared to other aircraft, we lost a lot of Hogs in Desert Storm, and had several more shot up pretty badly. At the end of about week 4, we were restricted from operating in quite a few areas because of the losses. Also restricted to stay above 10, if memory serves. IIRC we lost 6 or 7 airframes,3 POWs, lost a couple of good guys. Compared to other aircraft, it was a hi loss rate in a low threat mission. The A10 was one of the only aircraft allowed to self report BDA, and after action reports considerably downgraded the amount of damage done by Warthogs.
As an aside, I remember f111s having great success tank plinking with pods and LGBs. Didn't get the PR though.
After day one, the Iraqis had no effective C3 structure, and only tattered remnants of any real ADA.
It is a crappy short field airplane, with TO runs routinely above 4500 with any weapons on board. Austere ops means tents, not short runways. Runway got built before the O club.
All modern fighters are tough and survivable. A10s don't have any real edge there, IMHO.
You are getting most of your info from PR pieces and urban myths. Pay attention to what Ben has been saying. He is current and well versed from what I have read.
My own experience from flying them is dated, (1991) and my limited ALO experience is more gleaned from TACPs in my old guard unit than any real field work, but it supports what Ben has been trying to tell you.
The Army already has operational control of CAS assets. Giving them the airplanes means duplicating a host of support activities, and they wouldn't have any more CAS available than they have now, but they wouldn't have anyone to bitch about.

Sorry I'm late to the fight, fellas, but...I'm a Hawg driver, so you'll understand if I'm a bit slow.

I don't have a lot of time to get into the last five pages and rehash what has been said, but I must say...there is a lot of good point/counter point here.

As many might imagine, I am a big proponent of the A-10. I am a bit biased towards it, but I am fully aware of its strengths as well as its limitations.

I'm going to hit a few of the recurring themes here and then hit the sack:

- Close Air Support is a mission, but it is one that has been forced upon Big Blue since the Key West accords. It's not what they WANT to do, it's what they HAVE to do....they want bigger, faster, more expensive aircraft, not slower, cheaper, paid for ones. Hard to get that gold plated airplane unless you convince people the other ones just won't do.

- When Boyd and Pierre Sprey were helping with the A-X program, and when the A-10 was the eventual outcome, it was with the idea that you can make an airplane the jack of all trades but the master of none, OR you can build a platform without equal in a particular category. The A-10 is without equal in CAS. Reason? GAU-8. Why? PI - Probability of Incapacitation. There is no other weapon as effective in a danger close scenario, save the U-boat AC-130s (don't even get me started on the 'missile ship' 'gun'ships!), because of the low PI numbers on the gun. How? A-10 pilots train with the gun on a regular basis - almost every training mission includes gunnery practice.

I recently had the occasion to talk with a B-1 Wizzo who, unfortunately, had to drop JDAMs in a CAS scenario...while fragging the bad guys, they wound up inducing some civilian casualties as well. I understand that's war, but if there was an A-10 on station, the gun would have been able to avoid that scenario.

So you can tell me all you want that CAS is a mission, not a platform...and I can give you many more situations I've experienced first hand or I've heard of from other operators of other platforms where the A-10 was the right airplane for the job.

Ask the JTACs and Marines and Task Force operators and SEALs and other guys kicking the doors in at ground level what aircraft they want. It's either going to be an A-10 or an AC-130, depending.

- The A-10 is NOT survivable in a highly contested airspace. But that's what we have F-22s and F-15s and F-16s and F.A-18s for. OCA (Offensive Counter Air) and DCA (Defensive Counter Air) in coordination with X-CAS orbits/Killboxes/SCAR, when worked properly and plugged into the 'big picture' during the MAAP (Master Air Attack Plan) at the ATO (Air Tasking Order) planning level by the smart guys and gals in the CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) is what allows the A-10 to operate whenever there is an air threat. While we trained to run and then circle the Hogs to self-protect, we prayed to never be in that situation. We wanted to have the fast-moving radar missile slingers ready to cover us while we tucked our curly-cue tails and ran! Anyone who has participated in a LFE (Large Force Exercise) at Reg Flag or elsewhere should understand that we don't think for a second we're going out there alone and unafraid in anything other that a fully uncontested air-to-air environment.

- Anyone who thinks this is REALLY about the money is fooling themselves. It is a cheap airplane to fly, fight, and maintain. It's paid for. They just put new wing boxes on all of them to extend the lifespan to 2028. The Air Force brass sees an opportunity to put the final nail in the coffin of the A-10...an airplane they never really wanted, but were forced to keep during the cold war lest they relinquish that part of the budget to another of the armed forces. Just think of all the $400,000 F-35 pilot helmets they can buy with the retirement of the A-10 (no, I'm not even kidding.)

I would be happy to entertain any questions/comments/thoughts about the airplane, my experience with it, what it brings to the grunts on the ground, the Air Force's obsession with ridding themselves of it, or anything else regarding it.

One last thing - out of ALL the airplanes I've EVER flown, civilian or military - the A-10 was THE MOST FUN TO FLY. An absolute joy! Not just because of the gun - though that was great fun - but it is like an overbuilt, aerobatic, jet-powered Cessna 172 (with a 7-barreled, 30mm cannon out front). Easy to maneuver, light on the controls, no surprises...I am honored, privileged and humbled by having had the incredible opportunity to be part of its legacy.

As the son of a Marine, it is the one airplane that I could have possibly redeemed myself with for bringing shame upon the family name by joining the Air Force!!!

P.S. - Giving the A-10 to the Army would NOT be a good idea.

I spent almost an entire Army Warfighter exercise at Fort Leavenworth trying to get Army 0-5s, 0-6s, and a few 0-7s to understand what CAS brings to the fight and how to employ it.

I left largely defeated. These are not helicopters you are going to assign to a particular Battalion; it just don't work like that.

Giving them to the Marines, on the other hand...I believe the airplane would live on forever in their hands. If they could just realize that sometimes, it's best to NOT design the airplane to operate off a boat.

My Marine F/A-18 buddy from VMFA-323 (he didn't want to wind up in a boat squadron...so guess where he wound up) said it would have been a lot more economically viable, effective, and productive to take the entire carrier air wing off the boat and base them out of Kuwait or Bahrain. The logistics of carrier operations are insane. Another friend who flew Harriers out of Bagram got sick and tired of the jokes about whether he was carrying the targeting pod or the bomb...they were not designed to operate out of high & hot fields, so were extremely limited in what they could carry.

But I digress...and sleep is calling me....

Chris: I was an Army Forward Observer among other jobs. We were told the Army originally wanted the A-10, but the Air Force was adamant that all airplanes belong in the Air Force! Ever hear anything like that? I understand now they want to dump it to get newer toys.

Chris: I was an Army Forward Observer among other jobs. We were told the Army originally wanted the A-10, but the Air Force was adamant that all airplanes belong in the Air Force! Ever hear anything like that? I understand now they want to dump it to get newer toys.

Oh...and personal opinion only, though I know a dude involved in the F-35 program who is a former A-10 bubba (and would never be heard saying this publically) - the only thing the F-35 will truly ever be good at is turning Billions of dollars into noise and fattening the coffers at Lockheed.

...interesting perspectives...

--"Close Air Support is a mission, but it is one that has been forced upon Big Blue since the Key West accords. It's not what they WANT to do, it's what they HAVE to do"

...not sure that is totally accurate...certainly agree the AF doesn't want the mission--but a more accurate historical interpretation of the Key West agreement (and the decades thereafter) would be that the AF fought to keep the CAS mission for the purpose of not allowing the Army to obtain a larger responsibility for that role; and to prevent the Army from obtaining more fixed wing assets as well as the funding associated with the CAS mission that the AF would be entitled to otherwise...

--"So you can tell me all you want that CAS is a mission, not a platform...and I can give you many more situations I've experienced first hand or I've heard of from other operators of other platforms where the A-10 was the right airplane for the job."

...exactly, yet the AF continues to preach consistently otherwise in the current debate...

--"I recently had the occasion to talk with a B-1 Wizzo who, unfortunately, had to drop JDAMs in a CAS scenario...while fragging the bad guys, they wound up inducing some civilian casualties as well. I understand that's war, but if there was an A-10 on station, the gun would have been able to avoid that scenario."

...agree, and to make matters worse if the available CAS assets in inventory were deployed there would not be a necessity for supersonic bombers to perform the mission...not to mention the high costs we're incurring for the supersonic bombers' operation...

--The A-10 is NOT survivable in a highly contested airspace. But that's what we have F-22s and F-15s and F-16s and F.A-18s for..."

...interesting on the A-10 survivability issue...clearly all of our pilots believe the A-10 would not survive in a highly contested airspace on its own...but in any event, that reinforces the point that the A-10 is just like other weapon systems in the sense that its survivability depends on being deployed as part of a overall combined arms team concept...similarly--the Army would not deploy its tanks by themselves either in a high intensity conflict without supporting Infantry, Artillery assets, etc...and that is why the AF's claim--used to justify dumping the A-10--that the A-10 can't operate in a highly contested airspace is met with such skepticism...

--"Anyone who thinks this is REALLY about the money is fooling themselves"

...exactly, and Congress is starting to get this...

--"P.S. - Giving the A-10 to the Army would NOT be a good idea.
I spent almost an entire Army Warfighter exercise at Fort Leavenworth trying to get Army 0-5s, 0-6s, and a few 0-7s to understand what CAS brings to the fight and how to employ it.
I left largely defeated. These are not helicopters you are going to assign to a particular Battalion; it just don't work like that. "

...I'd be interested if you have also spent any time with Army leaders in field environments with their units such as the NTC or JRTC that might change your opinion on their CAS proficiency/knowledge...true, probably too late in the process to transfer the A-10 to the Army--but there was a time on more than one occasion where we wanted it in the past and I believe could have been successful employing it...and, if not the A-10 now, the next generation CAS aircraft (assuming we even have one) could certainly be fielded by the Army

...and, if the AF doesn't want the CAS mission (or the A-10)--then it's reasonable that the mission (and ACFT/resources) be transferred to the Army...I think Congress is starting to get this as well--although we are still pretty early in that process...

...there is not any reason why fixed wing CAS assets can't be directly assigned to and under the operational control of Army Maneuver Cdrs (most likely Division or Bde TF levels)--and I'd be interested Chris in your rationale against this otherwise...indeed, the Soviets we would have faced in WWIII had they attacked would have employed very similar tactics as they realized the value of decentralized control of certain aircraft by giving Manuever Cdrs who are in the fight the ability to most effectively deploy CAS aircraft as opposed to more rigid/centralized control otherwise...

--"Ask the JTACs and Marines and Task Force operators and SEALs and other guys kicking the doors in at ground level what aircraft they want. It's either going to be an A-10 or an AC-130, depending."

...exactly...and, its troublesome that in the current A-10 debate you never hear the AF spokesmen saying anything to the effect of having spent time in the field with the JTACs and that this is the feedback I'm getting on the topic, etc...

--"The Army already has operational control of CAS assets. Giving them the airplanes means duplicating a host of support activities, and they wouldn't have any more CAS available than they have now, but they wouldn't have anyone to bitch about."

...this has been stated before and is still not accurate...the A-10 debate doesn't center on what control the Army may or may not have have over CAS assets once in Theater...the primary issue is what aircraft will be on station in Theater to conduct the missions to begin with...and, it's not a matter of the Army "bitching" necessarily--but rather the Army expecting its AF "teammate" to conduct CAS missions with an appropriate type of aircraft--and with a degree of enthusiasm...or, in the alternative just be candid that they don't want to perform the CAS mission and Congress can reassign it to the Army in total...

--"All modern fighters are tough and survivable. A10s don't have any real edge there, IMHO."

...simply not the case--esp. in the context of CAS...indeed, the defense studies coming out of Vietnam and Korea noted the vulnerability in particular of the fast movers to small arms fire and was a key reason for the design of the A-10...the next generation fighters after the Vietnam era are not significantly any tougher--for instance, Sprey has observed that the F35 is very thin skinned and would be very vulnerable in a CAS role...

...re my contesting Jim's observations of the the A-10's Gulf War performance I'm informed that : "You are getting most of your info from PR pieces and urban myths."

...well, not exactly...for starters, please review some basic A-10 Gulf War data from the AF's own Combat Logistics Squadron I've linked to below...as an aside, I believe one must be careful not to draw too many conclusions on the A-10 from the Gulf War on either side of the debate as this conflict was unique in the sense that not only did we have total air superiority but we were able to conduct extensive bombing prior to initiating the attack on our own timetable...but since you brought it up, in addition to the data referenced below this AF site says we lost 6 A-10s in Desert Storm...a quick look at Wikipedia notes the Coalition lost 52 fixed winged aircraft during the War of which 28 were U.S. losses...given the high A-10 sortie rate and the nature of their missions "6" losses doesn't appear to be an unacceptable loss rate based on any historical perspective or guidelines I'm aware of



2951st Combat Logistics Support Squadron


A-10 Warthog Battle Damage Repair--Desert Storm 1991

http://www.2951clss-gulfwar.com/

Together, these A-10 and OA-10 aircraft conducted 8,624 sorties maintaining a 95.7% mission capable rate, 5% above A-10 peace-time rates, had the highest sortie rate of any USAF aircraft. They achieved:

967 tanks destroyed
1026 pieces of artillery destroyed
1306 trucks destroyed
281 military structures destroyed
53 Scud missiles destroyed
10 aircraft on the ground destroyed
2 air-to-air aircraft (helicopter) kills with the GAU-8A 30mm Avenger cannon...

Pilots often flew up to three missions per day with A-10's accounted for destroying 1/4 of Iraq's entire arsenal.

That's a lot of opinion spoken as if it was fact... (trend item)

I dunno Ben, I saw Mr. Guthrie state some clearly defined facts at the end of his most recent post.

Are you also going to dispute what I have laid out as well?

Thankfully it looks like the A-10 has been saved for the immediate future, and because of that, America still retains the preeminent CAS platform with a gun that has 80% dispersion over a 22' diameter from 9,000' slant range, long loiter time, and experts actuating the stick and throttles who specialize in delivering warheads on foreheads while in very close proximity to friendly troops.

I dunno Ben, I saw Mr. Guthrie state some clearly defined facts at the end of his most recent post.

Are you also going to dispute what I have laid out as well?

Thankfully it looks like the A-10 has been saved for the immediate future, and because of that, America still retains the preeminent CAS platform with a gun that has 80% dispersion over a 22' diameter from 9,000' slant range, long loiter time, and experts actuating the stick and throttles who specialize in delivering warheads on foreheads while in very close proximity to friendly troops.

Nope, I'm with you Chris. I'm happy to keep the Hog (STS). I'm all about one mission, two tails and two engines.

My point is that there's no proof positive that the USAF kept the CAS mission "Just to keep the Army from getting the funding" - yet it was stated as fact.

Also, after both the guy who protects strikers (me) and the guy who does CAS (you - Chris) say that the A-10 won't operate in contested airspace it's still a run-around to a conclusion that basically says 'ok, but I'm still right'

You were an ALO, working with the tactical level guys at length and in great detail, you have first hand knowledge that the Army has no clue what to do with a fixed wing CAS platform like the A-10. You are an expert at CAS and worked with the guys in question so I'd say that's as close to facts as you can get. Not good enough though apparently - you should talk to more Army people so they can change your mind (riiiight...)

It's just a trend item that no matter how much first hand operator information comes to light that:
1.) The Army isn't ready to have the Hog and that it's a bad idea &
2.) The CAS fight has changed since the 'Nam and most people don't understand how CAS - even with the Hog is done.

Mr. Guthrie will likely not budge on his opinion that he knows more from the sideline than those of us who are doing it know. Everyone is entitled to an opinion, I'm up for a discussion; real discussions revolve around expertise and known facts. This is not an example of that.

Evil - out.

I dunno Ben, I saw Mr. Guthrie state some clearly defined facts at the end of his most recent post.

Are you also going to dispute what I have laid out as well?

Thankfully it looks like the A-10 has been saved for the immediate future, and because of that, America still retains the preeminent CAS platform with a gun that has 80% dispersion over a 22' diameter from 9,000' slant range, long loiter time, and experts actuating the stick and throttles who specialize in delivering warheads on foreheads while in very close proximity to friendly troops.

You mean just like the B-52?

Tell me...what was the last year there was a newly-built BUFF?

Here's a blatant hijack but, since Chris brought up the Buff:

Couldn't a modern, combat militarized Airbus or Boeing airliner carry more payload to the target faster on less fuel, trailing less smoke than those eight tired old J57s dangling from a seventy year old wing?

(This CAS argument is starting to get too personal and drones will be doing the job in ten years anyway)