Yup, I can tell you as a former ground pounder marines work on nothing but hand-me-downs and you'll never meet a marine who doesn't feel good every time an A-10 or a Cobra goes over head.

I hate politicians. It's too bad much of the brass forgets that they're fighting men who should be dedicated to the mission and the men; seems like most anybody who gets flag officer status licks the political boot or gets drummed out. It seems like it's only getting worse, but what the hell do I know- just an enlisted puke, lol.

We had A-10's and Cobras (over our heads) when I was in the service....the security you get when one of them is either coming or onsite is extraordinary. They provide a HUGE advantage to anybody on the ground, period.

And WHAT an airplane....

I Saw on the news thst a squadron of hogs from Davis Monthan just arrived in Germany for possible action in the Ukraine.

as far as i know its the only plane thst has had enemy combatants surrender to.

( Desert Storm)

...I don't think the AF senior leadership A-10 deception is necessarily because they have become too political or forgotten where they came from...rather, they are just a natural product of their environment--of being in a culture where Officers (despite having the best aircraft, training, and belonging to the best military in the world) fail to embrace their assigned CAS mission...

...the AF's description of "contested" air space in future conflicts--and their contention that the A-10 will not be able to operate in such environments--is another issue that requires closer scrutiny...as background--the AF has mistakenly been questioning the A-10's viability for future conflicts since the Cold War was winding down...and since that time the A-10 performed extremely well during the Gulf War (91') and to date it has been one of our most relevant aircraft--especially in more recent low/mid intensity scenarios...

...just how is the AF defining "contested" airspace--and where in the world (and against which adversaries) are they claiming the A-10 will not be able to operate? ...scanning the globe--there are potential adversaries that have older Soviet equipment--but the A-10 was designed (and has been improved) with counter measure (and employs tactics) to combat this era of eq. ...perhaps North Korea comes across the border--but in that scenario the Warthog could not only effectively operate but would be critical to have in Theater to take on advancing enemy armor...China is a potential threat--but any conflict with them will likely not be for years; and even so would likely be regional in nature with Naval assets playing a significant role...

...and all of these potential conflicts to consider with the knowledge that the A-10 (esp. with upgrades/mods) can continue to be effective for decades...(as a point of reference--the B-52 which is 20+ years older and still useful)....despite the AF's implications otherwise--the most likely world scenarios to develop the next couple of decades regarding airspace, "contested" or otherwise, is low/mid intensity conflicts (with our ground troops fighting in hostile environments/unfamiliar terrain) which the A-10 is ideally suited...and, during that time period with the A-10 in the fight the next generation CAS platform could be developed....

...will also be interesting to see what comes out of the planned meeting between the new SecDef and JTACs(as they are the ones on the ground and who overwhelmingly support the A-10--and no doubt among our best resources for CAS combat experience from most recently working with all the aircraft)....hopefully the meeting will be closed door with no Officers present...

Ill start with saying that I'm a fan of the Hog, there is no true replacement and I hope we keep it.

Just responding to the definition of contested airspace...

As convenient as it is to say this isn't an issue, unfortunately it is. The difference I'll give you is that it doesn't just affect the Hog, it affects any 4th gen (and soon likely 5th gen) aircraft that want to operate anywhere that's not friendly. For example, an SA-20 is relatively cheap to buy considering the capes it brings. If you move one of those into bad guy land it severely hampers F-15/16/18 ops. It completely shuts down A-10 ops. That's the bottom line, the A-10 has zero capability to defend itself in that arena. That arena isn't just Russia/China anymore, it's proliferating fast. There will soon be a new norm for contested airspace and we'd better get used to it.

...no one is claiming that contested airspace isn't an issue as Ben suggests--in actuality it has always been an issue as it relates to the A-10's survivability, as well as other aircraft...the problem is that the concepts are being deceptively applied to the A-10 debate...and, it's all relative to the mission...in the Cold War the A-10 pilots expected to operate in contested airspace--and a tough survival rate was a given had the Warsaw Pact attacked...

...and assuming the A-10 is particularly vulnerable to a specific weapon system on the battlefield...even so, that doesn't mean it should be completely shut down in this instance as is being suggested...looking to the Cold War for example--the A-10 was never intended to be deployed into combat with hopes it would survive on its own...rather, the A-10's survivability in combat (just like many other weapon systems)--in addition to its design build and flight characteristics--was based on operating as part of an overall coordinated effort...that in a fight against the Warsaw Pact other assets (artillery, attack helicopters, electronic warfare systems, ground attack aircraft) would be brought to bear to suppress enemy air defense systems in order for the A-10 to fully operate...same holds for more current times (from Desert Storm to Afg.) and to the future as it relates to the contested airspace issue: if there are particularly lethal weapons on the battlefield that threaten the Warthog our field commanders can prioritize their efforts and assets to take them out--doesn't mean we have to shut down A-10 CAS operations...

...it's all smoke and mirrors, but with significant consequences...the AF doesn't want to let go of the CAS assignment (and associated funding) but at the same time has no interest in the A-10 or the gun runs (danger close) aspect of the missions...with the F-35 and doctrinal modifications the AF is attempting to redefine the very nature of CAS by deemphasizing gun runs that have always been a necessary component (at critical times) of the mission...the AF is deceptively stating that the A-10 is too vulnerable to even take off in future "contested airspaces", but not to worry because improvements in technology will permit fast movers such as the F-35 and supersonic bombers as the B-1 to "adequately" perform CAS from stand-off range with missiles/bombs...astonishing...

...and it begs the question: given the cost of the F-35--and its obvious vulnerabilities as a fast mover to enemy ground fire--does the AF ever intend to deploy it under any circumstances in a traditional gun run capacity during a CAS mission?

".......and it begs the question: given the cost of the F-35--and its obvious vulnerabilities as a fast mover to enemy ground fire--does the AF ever intend to deploy it under any circumstances in a traditional gun run capacity during a CAS mission?"

Yup, there it is, the three hundred million dollar question. How could you afford to place that weapon system in range of small arms fire from the ground? You think an enemy soldier isn't going to take a pot shot with his $75 AK and get lucky sometime?

In the 70s, our jamming equipment could render radar tracking of Russian ZSU 23 and 57 AAA useless but, below 3500' AGL, their optical tracking became effective and fleet doctrine was always complete your pullout above that. Can you deliver effective CAS for troops engaged at close quarters from 3500' or above? Looks as though the Cobra drivers are going to be very busy.

No doubt the A-10 is crucial in the CAS role once the airspace gets cleared of airborne and most surface to air threats.

I can't imagine the F-35 will be anything other than an utter failure as a substitute for the Hog - especially in the danger close/gun run department.

Politics trump tactics again... and they wonder why people are getting out in droves!

Damn dust/allergies...

http://taskandpurpose.com/unsung-heroes ... d-marines/

In all honesty do you really believe the Air Force would let a capable missle system survive the first nights operations? i thought Air Dominence ... Was the buzz word for the day. The promise that the Air Force would entirely own the battle space.

Good gawd people, you would do way better with many many more cheaper airplanes providing more support for people actually in combat. I mean the airforce ought to shelve the B1 and buy a ton of those aircraft Beech tried to see the Afgans.

The biggest advantage of the A10 is that it is a single mission aircraft. CAS is all a hog driver does, so they get good at it.
It's real use is a low threat conflict. As the threat level kicks up, it gets harder to do without speed to minimize exposure to threat envelopes. As B1s, B52s, and anything else that an LGB can be strapped to have moderate success at low threat CAS, it gets harder to justify a single mission platform. Army and Marine units have their own organic rotary wing CAS assets, so the piece of the pie left for the A-10 is shrinking.
At some point the money is better spent elsewhere.

...interesting to contemplate the AF's evolving tactics on the A-10 and their current doctrine not to launch it until all threat aircraft are removed from the airspace--even presumably in a high intensity conflict...interesting to think over if these are legit decisions due to the threat aircraft advancements since the Cold War for instance--or are they highly debatable doctrinal changes otherwise

...in the Cold War high intensity scenario it would have been days from the Warsaw Pact's initial attack that we could realistically have expected to achieved air superiority--and that's a best case scenario....and, in that scenario we were on defense and didn't have the opportunity to destroy enemy assets prior to the battle...but had the WP attacked--the A-10s would have been immediately deployed with NATO's forces to thwart the WP's drive to the Rhine...and given the makeup of the A-10 pilots I met in Germany back in the day no doubt they would have been in the thick of things quickly (just like the pilots in Doug's referenced article)...and, if they had not launched at the time of attack--the A-10's chances of surviving sitting on the ground until air superiority was achieved would have been low...once airborne the A-10 enhanced its survivability in the air against the fast movers by masking against the terrain; and we know that the enemy's fast movers would have been fighting for air superiority against our fighters and also would have been assigned other priority targets and therefore not likely been able to necessarily target our A-10s specifically

...thought the Beech Light Attack Aircraft was designed primarily for guerrilla type warfare and not necessarily CAS--esp. in mid/high intensity conflicts...have read that the AF has been considering--off and on though--the next generation CAS platform design...that will be interesting to follow...AF is for sure at work though on the next generational fighters and bombers...

....true, the Army has its own helicopter CAS assets...but tactically--they work best in tandem with fixed wing acft; and despite their own capabilities were not intended to be a substitution for fixed wing CAS...additionally, our helicopters have other battlefield missions other than CAS...as to spending money better elsewhere--perhaps, but the Jury is still out...not seeing Congress allowing the A-10 dump until the AF provides more logical rationale...seems the AF can still fulfill all of its assigned missions...if not, then they should relinquish the role to the Army and drop objections to the Army obtaining fixed wing acft...assign the Army maneuver commanders solid CAS Aircraft (taking them out of the AF's antiquated centralized control) and they will find a way to make this work...

I think SAMs are a bigger issue than enemy air assets. Even in Desert Storm, SAMs remained an issue until then end. A10s aren't notably better at terrain masking than anything else, and being low puts you in the heart of the envelope for everything from small arms up. 300 knots means every manpad out there gets a good long look. Modern high threat CAS would have a tremendous attrition rate, even with air supremacy.

Current Joint doctrine has CAS assets allocated to Army control, to use as they see fit. "CAS request denied" is an Army call, not Air Force.

The biggest argument for the Hog is being a specialty aircraft. Unfortunately that means it doesn't do much else. You pays your money and you takes your choice. The A10 shines in low threat CAS and is tolerable in medium threat. The question, really, is can we afford to optimize for a low threat war when the weapon systems for a conflict with a modern military need upgrading?

I'm a former Hog Driver, and would love to see it stick around, but I think OEF/OIF has done some damage to legacy warfighting abilities. Gotta get ready for the next one, not the last one.

...in follow up to our ongoing dialogue and to Jim's comments based on his experience, I'd agree as has been asserted that the enemy's SAMs are a greater threat to the A-10 than enemy aircraft...but as discussed earlier--other battlefield assets can be brought to bear to suppress enemy AD systems...guess I would question though the assertion that "A10s aren't notably better at terrain masking than anything else" as I observed them back in the day during USAREUR exercises maneuvering thru the West Germany rolling countryside in ways I'm certain enemy fast movers, for example, could not replicate....as far as tactics in a high intensity conflict: no doubt the A-10 pilots would fact tough choices as to which altitudes to operate at any given time...tough tactical decisions to be sure--just like with any other weapon systems that would have to be made by all service members during the course of the fight... as far as high attrition rates: my best friend in Germany was a Troop Commander with the 11th ACR on the Fulda Gap--he could have opined on high attrition rates as well under an invasion scenario from the Warsaw Pact......but, if the mission has to be accomplished.........

...comments as " 'CAS request denied' is an Army call, not Air Force." are not completely forthcoming...notwithstanding Army input in Theater--CAS decisions were shaped well before the battle by which air assets the AF deployed...if the Army was making the call we wouldn't be over relying on supersonic bombers/fast movers while many of our most capable CAS aircraft (A-10s) that are fully operational but yet Stateside waiting on some tarmac for the boneyard...

...to improve CAS assets' control/utilization the Army has made different proposals in the past that were rejected by the AF...one proposal was that fixed wing CAS assets (such as A-10s with AF pilots/support personnel) would be attached/placed under control of Army's Bde TFs or Divisions indefinitely...in this scenario the Army could more effectively utilize its CAS assets--esp. for danger close missions the A-10 is suited for--and then coordinate with the AF for other missions support as necessary...another option was for the CAS mission itself (with transfer of fixed wing assets) to be permanently assigned to the Army...either option would have been more effective than the current antiquated system...

...questions as "can we afford to optimize for a low threat war when the weapon systems for a conflict with a modern military need upgrading? " can also be misleading...it's conjecture to imply the A-10 (in Combined Arms tactics) can't perform in a high intensity conflict (that would be akin to telling the Army to leave its helicopters behind if the balloon went up against a modern military)...the more relevant question is: if not the A-10 then what? ...the F35 is clearly ill suited for the role and the next CAS acft is not in development...

...as far as the A-10s Legacy: common for weapon's defects to be exposed in combat and to apply them in future development (would be interesting thought to to see that list to consider the impact on its legacy)...in any event, the A-10 remains the preferred aircraft among the JTACs, Army and Marines most recently in the fight...and as one Senator so eloquently stated: "The Taliban hates the A-10, that's good enough for me."

Despite anything the Air Force might say, there is no other plane that can provide CAS like the A-10. The A-10 can engage enemy targets just a mere 25 meters in front of friendlies. Nothing else comes close.