In many of these cases, maybe most of them, the gear was down at impact. It just happens so fast that there wasn't the normal time to get to the gear.

It really does happen right at rotation, before gear up.

This is true of the Addison crash, for example. The gear is still fully out at impact.

"Examination of the wreckage found both main landing gear in a position consistent with being extended"


Mike C.

Or...

Left hand on the yoke, right on the throttles.
Rotate.
Positive rate - gear up!
The right hand leaves the throttles and moves towards the gear lever, but the rollback is quick with simultaneous yaw and the right hand never reaches the gear.

Or...

Left hand on the yoke, right on the throttles.
Rotate.
Positive rate - gear up!
The right hand leaves the throttles and moves towards the gear lever, but the rollback is quick with simultaneous yaw and the right hand never reaches the gear.

It really does happen right at rotation, before gear up.

This is true of the Addison crash, for example. The gear is still fully out at impact.

"Examination of the wreckage found both main landing gear in a position consistent with being extended"


Mike C.[/quote]
Then it’s happening at V1 when the pilot takes his hands of throttles.[/quote]

In the Addison crash it was said that the pilot, with a lot of Gulfstream experience had a habit of rotating with both hands.

He also had his right foot in a orthopedic boot and had a co-pilot who "knew Fusion"

That aircraft appeared to be wings somewhat level and should have been controllable, up until the last few seconds prior to hitting the hangar.

Based on that video, the PL would walk back as soon as you let it go. This leads to the question of why this happens right at rotation and not before or after.

A possible theory is that the pilot holds the power levers during the takeoff roll in preparation to abort, then, at rotation or some point where they commit to flying, they move their hands to the yoke, and then the left PL walks back from spring force and you end up with an uncontrollable plane in the most critical phase of flight. The results have been catastrophic, to say the least.

Serious design flaw that doesn't seem to afflict other types. Basically people are dead because Beech used too strong a spring that will overcome the natural friction of the control cable.

Mike C.

He did everything wrong. He was known for not using a checklist and he should have had the copilot guard the power levers or retract the gear. He didn’t need to use both hands to rotate if the trim was set properly. He probably lacked sim training and being thorough confused may have pushed the wrong rudder pedal initially. He may not have been accustomed to the aggressive rudder boost and not understanding what was happening it may have been a reflex action similar to a response to turbulence or a wind gust. Even if he didn’t do that he only had a split second to get the power in as he was too low to lower the nose enough to make much of a difference.

In the linked video of the 90 crash in Brazil at the end of my compilation of left turning takeoffs crashes it appears that the power levers may have been retarded and the nose was coming down in a effort to arrest the Vmc induced roll but it was too late. He had too much heading change and he impacted a hangar and burned. Had he not impacted the hangar it may have been survivable.

I still have a hard time with the 200 that crashed with one of the founders of the King Air academy at the controls. He obviously was well aware of the phenomenon. That is why I think it is possible that he took off with a broken friction lock band rivet. Possibly from tightening it more than normal. That is why I believe that it is so important to actually function check the friction lock prior to every engine start. And to momentarily lift your right hand while guarding the power levers for a moment prior to going for the gear while building a little more speed.

I don’t think anything significant has changed causing these accidents to be more prevalent. I do believe that there were many that were never properly solved.

That one hurt. A lot. Ron was a friend, I had just talked to him for over an hour on the phone a couple of weeks before it happened. What a great guy. His accident was different and I don't know what to think, I'm not convinced it was PLM.

Honestly, it hurts too damn much to think about it... even now.

That one hurt. A lot. Ron was a friend, I had just talked to him for over an hour on the phone a couple of weeks before it happened. What a great guy. His accident was different and I don't know what to think, I'm not convinced it was PLM.

Honestly, it hurts too damn much to think about it... even now.

I suspect a number of the accident pilots knew about PLM. Most of them seem reasonably proficient and experienced.

Knowing about it doesn't mean you will be able to handle it.

Mike C.

I suspect a number of the accident pilots knew about PLM. Most of them seem reasonably proficient and experienced.

Knowing about it doesn't mean you will be able to handle it.

Mike C.

The king air 350 is commuter category certified to part 25 single engine standards, meaning it will fly one engine after V1. You are taught not to abort after V1 in the 350, just like a jet, which is why Flight safety has you move your hand off the power level. I've been to 350 school a few times years back. Never had "plm" in the 350. Had a power lever slide back maybe 25 percent in a 90, was a non event, just add a little more rudder and carry on, then I noticed the power lever.

When I managed and flew an e90 10 years ago beechtalk was positive all the King Air crashes after takeoff were due to a torque runaway misidentified as an engine failure...

It won’t fly very far with one engine just after V1 with the auto feather disarmed.

I don’t think a #2 engine torque runaway that occurs at VR only is a very common event on a King Air. Have you ever heard of one happening?

This. Definitely this.

Most of my KA time had the "far reach" gear handle. Maybe that's better since you cross the quadrant. I don't know.
But I would do just as you describe just to make sure the things stay where I put them.

Sorry for your loss of a good friend.

What in particular did you see as being different or disqualifying as to not being within the profile of a typical PLM accident? I think it checked all of the boxes except maybe the pilot being thoroughly familiar with the potential hazard.